.1)413 



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Saraluga Daily Jouriud, 8th August, 1883. 

GATES vs. BUEGOYNE. 
A Ple/V in behalf of Gates — "Anchor" draws out an Answer. 

To THE EmTOR OF THE JoURNAL : 

I see that "Anclior" (General J. Watts cle Peyster) uses a large 
portion of one page of the Journal this morning to convince himself, 
and possibly others, that the sole credit of the victory of Saratoga and 
the surrender of Burgoync belonged to General Philip Schuyler, the 
waiting McClellan of the Revolutionary war, and to write down Gene- 
ral Horatio Gates as a mere accident of fortune and a blunderer. 

Now, I agree with General de Peyster, that the monument at 
Schuylerville is mislocated, and that Burgoyne Avas responsible for 
his own defeat in not obeying his orders in going up Lake George to 
Fort William Henry, there leave his artillery and baggage, and follow 
down the Loudon military road direct from there to Albany, that was 
constructed in 1758, and over which Abercrombie's and Amherst's 
armies had marched in that and the following years. In the latter 
army General Horatio Gates and General Phillips, chief of Burgoyne's 
artillery, had held subaltern positions in the same regiment. 

But I think he confesses judgment against Schuyler when he tells 
how easily Phillips drove St. Clair from Fort Ti by planting a battery 
on the unguarded but commanding Mount Defiance. For he forgets 
to state that when Gates superseded Schuyler the latter had retreated 
to the Sprouts of the Mohawk, and was throwing up those earthworks 
that yet remain on the islands opposite Waterford, totally unmindful 
that Burgoyne would probably cross the Mohawk at the Loudon ford, 
about a mile above the Cohoes falls, and could easily shell him out of 
his pits from batteries to be placed on the heights where the mansion 
of ex-Mayor Johnston of Cohoes now stands. 

Then he attributes to Schuyler the impeding of Burgoyne's ascent 
of Wood creek from Skenesboro. The historical truth is that it was 
done by Colonel Long in his retreat, who wisely used his powder in 
blasting I'ocks from the bluffs above Fort Ann, in the narrow gorge 
through which the creek flows, and effectually destroyed its navigation. 

Whatever may have been the merits of Gates' defeat at Camden 
with his raw militia against Cornwallis' veterans, at Saratoga he was 
on ground familiar to his early manhood when serving in the English 
army. He correctly moved his army as far north as he could to re- 
trieve the blunder of Schuyler's retreat, and if he had been defeated at 
Bemis Heights, intended to fall back behind Anthony's kill at Me- 
chanicville, j^nd if needs be across the Mohawk, and thus have three lines 
of vantage to depend upon, or fair grounds, instead of being "bottled" — 



2 BUBGOYNE. 

as Grant expressively said of Ben. Busier wlien he placed himself in a 
like erroneous position — on the islands/in the delta of the Mohawk. 

I do not question the }>atriotism of C/eneral Philip Schuyler. It was 
as pure as the virgin gold. l>ut his military capacity, like that of some 
generals on both sides in the late rebellion, who leaped to the saddle from 
their seats in Congress, is open to criticism that his friends must admit 
of. At Gettysburgli the impetuous Dan. Sickles, ignorant of the arts 
of war but brave to a fault, moved his corps from the line estal)lished 
by Gen. Meade, in a moment when he thought the exigencies of war 
required it. Longstreet poured his legions through that gap and thou- 
sands of brave Union soldiers had fallen before the gallant Hancock 
had retrieved the day and Sickles himself had received the wound that 
makes him a maimed veteran on the streets of Saratoga to-day. So 
Schuyler. Gates retrieved his error before it reached the strait that 
happened at Gettysburgh, and the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga 
followed from the wisdom of that movement of Gen. Gates. 

Historical Justice. 

Saratoga Springs, Aiij^'ust 7. 



SuralO(fa Duilij Jvunuil, Thurn(l;iy, ijOUi Au^'uhI. 1883. 

WHO "BUKGOYNED" BUEGOYNE. 

AN ANSWER TO A " PLEA ON BEHALF OF GATES." 

"Anciiou draws out AN Answer" — wiiicii is answered. 

" The most fortunate, and at the same time unfortunate, of the generals of the 
Revolution, Horatio Gates, was, like Lee, St. Clair, Conway [Montgomery, La 
Fayette, de Coudray, de Kalb, Howe, Steuben, Duportail, de Woedtke, Mercer, 
Mcintosh, de Fermoy, de Borre, and Puhiski, de La Neuville, Irvine, Armand, 
de LaRouerie, Kusciusko,] a foreigner by birth [and initiator}' service]. He was 
one of those individuals whom fortune rather than ability makes famous. With 
little original talent, but great self-sufliciency ; more of the fine soldier than the 
true general; elegant, but shallow; chivalrous in manner rather than in fact ; cap- 
tious, unjust, stooping to low arts to rise ; yet courteous, dignified, honorable 
according to ordinary standards ; a fair tactician and a brave man, a soldier wlio 
bore misfortune better than success, his character presents itself to the analyst as 
merely that of a common-i)lace commander, without one atom of the liero in his 
comi)osition. A train of fortunate circumstances presented victory before him, and 
though he had tlie genius [V] to secure it, he liad none beyond that. Had he been 
more self-poised he might have proved a greater man. But, unlike Washington 
[and Grant], success destroyed his equilibrium of mind, and precipitated him into 
acts of presumptuous folly." — "Peterson's Military History of the Revolution." 

While " Historical Justice," in the iJa'dy Journal of the 8th, treats 
my article in the issue of the 7th witli so much courtesy — whicli is ac- 
knowledged in like spirit — the very modulated tone of his paragrajths 
made the more dangerous as a vindication of Gates, who never did 
anything to merit so chivalric a cliampion. It is now my intention to 
endeavor to answer this knightly opponent clause by clause. 



<r< 



BURGOYNE. 3 

As " Historical Justice " gives up Burgoyne, all that remains to be 
done here is to pay due attention to the case of Gates. 

Gibbon, who stands indisputably at the head of historians — let 
^^ whoever attempt to criticise his master-piece of English literature on 
^ . any grounds whatever — in a note remarks that Dr, Adam Smith, in 
"" his " Wealth of Nations," " proves, perhaps too severely, that the most 
' salutary effects have flowed from the meanest and most selfish causes." 
Whoever wil) examine into the interior history and correspondence of 
the American Revolution will find how truly this remark applies to 
the many developments of that event. With the exception of Wash- 
ington, Schuyler and certain other noble spirits — among whom Gates 
has no place — the men of foreign extraction who shot up into promi- 
nence were actuated altogether by interested motives. With the excep- 
tion, perhaps, of LaFayette, there was really no disinterested individual 
of ability who came from abroad to the assistance of the struggling col- 
onies (Chastellux, } , 304-5). Rank, glory, high pay — which, by the way, 
they did not get — were the lures, and de Kalb, who displayed gallantry 
enough at Camden to redeem a lifetime, was the paid agent of the French • 
Ministry " fishing in troubled waters " for the benefit rather of France 
flian of America (Graham III., iv., 459, &c.) What good the English 
Lee or the English Gates did for this country, it would be difficult to 
show. 

It is said that a dissection of character made according to the un- 
failing rules of physiology, physiognomy and phrenology has never 
failed to reveal the secrets of any man's character. Take the best 
likenesses, pen, pencil or medalic, of Gates, study the face and figure, 
and the gauntlet can safely be thrown down to any one who will at- 
tempt the examination, defying him to prove by any rule of judgment, 
admitted as trustworthy, that Gates can be shown to have had in him 
any of the elements of a great commander or of an able man ; while 
on the other hand there are plenty of the indications of a character 
which only rises by tortuous metliods, the inevitable recourse of lower 
minds — minds too often destitute of any of the higher gifts. " His 
portrait," writes Peterson, as seen on the Burgoyne medal, " is emi- 
nently characteristic. The finely chiseled profile, and gi-aceful flow 
of the hair, contrasted with the low and retreating forehead, conjure 
up vividly before the mind the idea of elegant mediocrity.''^ 

This rule of judging may be styled idealism. Sir Humphrey Davy 
wrote to Dr. Kingsley, " Nothing exists but Tlioughts^'' and the 
• " Science of Man " declares " we must either say all is Mind, with the 
idealist, or all is Matter with the materialist." The writer believes 
with the advocates of Mind, which, in any grand sense, Gates did not 
have, and by mind must the Briton be judged. 

Now let us see if the indications of the Science of Lavater are not 
borne out by incontestable facts. Leaving out for another article, if ne- 
cessary, any detailed investigation of "Historical Justice's" accusation 
against Schuyler, it would l)e unjust not to repel the parallel between 
New York's representative man and New Jersey's political idol. 



4 BURGOYNE. 

To institute a comparison between a commander who, with 134,285 
men, was held at bay by 55,000 and j^hantasms at first ; tlien by 10,000 
(Magruder says 5,000) ; and who wlien, still at the head of 115,000, 
was hustled around generally by inferior numbers, is pretty hard 
upon another who did do something with a few poor troops against 
double the number of excellent ones and planned and carried out two 
highly successful flank operations. Much as the writer dislikes Gates 
— and lest the dead sliould know of what ])asses here, and have their 
feelings hurt in consequence — he would not couple names nor institute 
l)arallels, as "Historical Justice" has done since. Gates did liold the 
ground he assumed, and did not change his base, nor was Ids Malvern 
Bemis Heights, aided by a sister service ; neither was his first fight, 
Freeman's Farm, simply defensive, like Malvern Hill, and although a 
victory followed by a retreat. The success, however, in very truth, 
was not his, since Arnold did pretty much all that was done, notwith- 
standing Gates then tried, and his friends have ever since endeavored, 
to deprive the American of any credit whatever and the latter, the ad- 
mirers of Gates, to give it to the Britisher. 

Gates did nothing but talk, and lie was great at that. Gates was 
actually arguing with a dying English ofiicer and aggravating hiiri^ 
a mortally wounded prisoner, while Arnold was winning for him the 
final battle of Saratoga, an exj)loit which must have chagrined Gates 
to the uttermost, since nothing was farther from his mind than to 
afford Arnold an opportunity to Avin any glory whatever. The Ameri- 
can j)eople accepted Gates as a hero through ignorance, just as an un- 
tutored negro acce})ts a bone with a feather stuck in it for a god. 

The writer has never talked with an individual Avhosc ancestors 
served at Saratoga, except one, whose father was a personal friend of 
Gates, who ever gave any credit to Gates and did not, on the other 
hand, give all the credit to Schuyler. 

Oh, that a fellow trustee of the Saratoga [Battlefield] Monument 
Association — who had forefathers and a numl)er of their friends at 
Saratoga, in 1777 — would come out in print and express what he has 
forcibly said in conversation in regard to the recent statements depre- 
ciating the pretensions of Gates and endorsing the merits of Schuyler. 

Lt.-Col. Kingston, Burgoyne's adjutant general, testified : " I re- 
member our scouts giving information that a bridge was laid over the 
Hudson river, very near the enemy's camp ; and it was the opinion of 
some very confidential men that Avere employed in that army in that 
capacity, and were much under the direction of General Fraser, that 
on tlie apj)roach of Sir Henry Clinton's army, the army of JNfr. Gates 
could not stand us, but would cross the river and go towards New 
England." 

If it is true that Gates refused to send regular troofis, or those he 
deemed trustworthy, to defend Albany, was it not a proof, if of no- 
thing else, that lie Avas afraid that Burgoyne would get the better of 
him anyAvay? Is it not true that he Avould not Aveaken himself by a 
single efficient man ? If Avorsted, did he not intend to step off across 



BURGOYNE. 5 

his bridge into Ncav England ? Snch would have been an elegant 
manoeuvre indeed with militia. Gates might have got off, but the 
British artillery from the Heights would soon have knocked the bridge 
into "pi," and the Hudson would have been filled with Yankees as the 
Potomac was with Unionists after Ball's Bluff ; and as on the 20th of 
September, after Antietam, when a part of Fitz John Porter's divis- 
ion were pushed over, and according to a bitter Rebel writer, that 
river was soon "blue with drowning Yankees," "filled with dead and 
wounded attempting to escape." This would have realized the allusion 
of " Historical Justice" to the effect of Burgoyne's batteries on the 
heights of Cohoes, upon Schuyler's "pits" or earthworks among the 
Sprouts of the Mohawk. 

"Historical Justice" says that "Anchor" "confesses judgment 
against Schuyler when he tells how easily Phillips drove St. Clair 
from Fort 'Ti' by planting a battery on the unguarded but com- 
manding Mount Defiance." 

Spirit of justice ! If Schuyler was to blame for St. Clair, or the 
latter for himself, in connection with Ticonderoga, has Gates a leg- 
left to stand on ? Why did Gates himself neglect to fortify Mount 
Defiance, the key to Ty, when this great genius was in command in 
the previous year, and the capabilities and the perils of that height were 
indicated and demonstrated by palpable proofs by Trumbull and others. 
Genius loves to grapple with such problems, and true genius solves 
them. Gates had no genius for war, however much for intrigue. 

With regard to Gates' "defeat at Camden," "Anchor" and "His- 
torical Justice" are at direct issue. Gates called his force " The Grand 
Army." Now,'even if he was a fool, which is not charged — a boaster or 
worse to call it so — he would not have presumed to make himself a com- 
plete laughing-stock by giving to it such a pompous title, as "The 
Grand Army," (? !) if it had been composed entirely of "raw militia," 
or if even those were good for nothing against the British. In the 
honest sense of " raw militia," is that term applicable to men who had 
been engaged all their life in continued warfare, of one kind or another; 
to men perfectly accustomed to the use of fire-arms, and who, on more 
than one occasion, had been in action. The same quality of troops 
conquered the picked "Provincial Brigade" of the "distinguished par- 
tisan " Ferguson, by the weight and accuracy of their fire. 

As to preparation, he did nothing. It is conceded that Gates "did 
Jiot even know the strength of the force that was to be handled." 
He expected to surprise Cornwallis. He himself was surprised. " It 
was still within the power of General Gates to fall back to a strong 
position ; but he lacked nerve and decision for such an hour." He 
called his generals — he had plenty of them — asking what is to be 
done ? The gallant Stevens answered: " Is it not too late note to do 
anything but fight." 

The New Englanders charged Schuyler with haughtiness. These 
people would not brook discipline. Gates was supercilious and over- 
bearing in the extreme when he had no point to gain by an ojiposite 



6 nUMGOYNE. 

course. Just as Leake tells us in his "Life of Lamb," that he treated 
Captain Mott in 1777, ho repulsed Marion just before Camden in 1780. 
It is said that no regularly educated or ex])erienced officer of his rank 
in the colonial army had seen so little actual or active service consist- 
ent with that rank as Gates. Bancroft, who was no friend to Schuy- 
ler, stigmatizes Gates as "an intriguer and no soldier." His march to 
the field of Camden was disgraceful to him as a general ; how much 
more so his abandonment of the field. 

General Carrington, one of the ablest and most careful of the 
writers on the American Revolution, says : "Gates had no povier in ac- 
tion, and there is not a redeeming fact during his connection with the 
Southern army to show his fitness to command troops." (513, B. A. R.) 
" It has been seen that he participated actively in one j)art of the 
operations near Saratoga until the morning of August 11th, 1777. 
Confiding in numbers, and neglecting reconnoissances, he then im- 
periled his army by forcing several brigades across Fishkill cre(!k, 
while remaining in the rear himself." Just as he plunged like a reck- 
less incapable into the chanip-clos, or lists of Camden. 

" Historical Justice" makes a great point of the veterans of Corn- 
wallis. His army were not all "veterans." Does "Historical Justice" 
knows that out of these nominal veterans (C. 23G), Lord Rawdon, who 
commanded the British left, had no "veterans." It consisted of the 
Royal Volunteers of Ireland, raised in America since 1776 ; the Legion 
Infantry, to whom a similar remark applies ; Colonel Hamilton's Corps 
of North Carolina Loyal Volunteers, recently recruited ; and Colonel 
Bryan's North Carolina Loyal Volunteers, organized in 1780. There 
is no doubt that they were better stuff than the militia opposed to 
them, but especially so because they were commanded by men of more 
sterling ({ualities, since it was admitted that the loyalist or tory — most 
honorable title, in his case — Hamilton, was a man of distinguished 
ability. 

We now come to the last paragraph of " Historical Justice's " 
article, in which he compares the military capacity of Schuyler with 
that of Sickles, and puts a head on the latter for his action at Gettys- 
burgh. 

On this subject "Anchor" has much to say, for he knows all about 
it and would snaj) his fingers at the o])inions of the Avhole world if they 
were against his own. Fortunately, he does not stand alone in his 
judgment, but has backers of the highest authority. Grant, to whom 
the question was submitted on the ground, after listening to arguments 
unfavorable to Sickles, said: "Sickles was right." 

That Longstreet poured his legions through " that gap" is one of 
the greatest fallacies that ever got into print. "That gap" never ex- 
isted. If any unmilitary writer chooses to style the interval or space 
between the right fiank of a force thrown forward in echelon and the 
left flank of the next force more to the right and rear, there was a 
"gap," but not a rebel soldier ever got through it. Longstreet broke 
through the left of the Third Corps where there was no "gap," simply 



BURGOYNE. 7 

because the Tliird Corps was breached or punched and was not ade- 
quately supported. Hancock came in to retrieve Meade's error, not 
the fault of Sickles, because Sickles had committed no error. Hancock 
saved Meade from the effects of his own want of prevision, and not 
from any act either of omission or of commission on the part of Sickles, 
simply because Sickles did not expose himself to either charge. 

Finally, Gates at Saratoga did nothing and retrieved nothing. He 
jeopai'dized everything on the morning of the 11th of August, 1777, 
(Carrington, 514,) and then, like the conventional stage father, bene- 
factor or chief — who had done scarcely anything throughout the piece, 
but show himself — came to the front at the last moment, with " Bless 
you, my children;" stepped elegantly to the footlights and pronounced 
a few words of Epilogue. Then the prompter rang down the curtain 
and the pseudo conqueror walked off, like Time conducted by Destiny, 
in the opera bouffe of " Orphee aux Enf ers," to reappear as Alexander 
at the head of his " Grand Army" in his next performance at Camden, 
which was a tragedy indeed for the country, and one of the worst 
failures on record of a general for himself. Anchor (J. W. de P.) 



Saratoga Evening Journal, Friday, 7t,h September, 1883. 

COL. LONG AT WOOD CREEK. 

We publish a brief article to-day from General de Peyster ("An- 
chor"), in reply to a criticism on his former article on General Schuy- 
ler, by " Historical Justice." Both these writers are gentlemen Avho 
know pretty well whereof they speak, and the topic is one of real in- 
terest to students of the Revolutionary history of Saratoga. 

Col. Long and Wood Creek, 6-7 July, 1777. 
To THE Editor of the Journal : 

" Historical Justice" goes on to say, " Then he [Gen. de P.] attrib- 
utes to Schuyler "the impeding of Burgoyne's ascent of Wood Creek" 
up from Skenesborough. " The historical truth is that it was done by 
Colonel Long in his retreat, who wisely used his powder in blasting 
rocks from the bluffs above Fort Ann, in the narrow gorge through 
which the creek flows, and effectually destroyed its navigation." What 
proofs can be produced for this claim on behalf of Colonel Long '? 

The British broke through the boom barrier, or bridge, at Ticon- 
deroga before 9 A. m., Gth July, and reached Skenesborough (now 
Whitehall) only two hours later than the Americans — early in the 
afternoon of the same day. Colonel Long landed his battalion at 
about 3 p. M.,* 6th July, and marched directly to Fort Ann, eleven or 



* " The [American] boats reached Skenesborough about three o'clock on the 
afternoon of the same day [Gth July], when the fugitives landed to enjoy, as they 
fancied, a temporary repose ; but in less than two hours they were startled by the 




LIBRORV OF >^^L»*^V. 1^.. 

8 BUIWOYNK. 

twelve miles further south. He must have euiist llll»iijii"i^''''^'^'^''g^^ 2 
light gettinj; over that (listance througli the woods .».n.i nwajups. Jiaily 
next day, 7th July, Long retraced his steps three miles, had a hard 
tight with the British Colonel Hill, and that afternoon, having returned 
to Fort Ann and burned it, retired to Fort Edward, on the Hudson. 
That is to say, this Colonel Long, who is represented as using his pow- 
der in blasting rocks on the 6th, still had powder enough to fight next 
day a smart little battle whieh lasted a number of hours. How did 
the soldiers under Long obtain or carry with them any super-abundant 
l)owder on this exhausting march, and where did he get tools to drill 
and a])pliances for blasting? He did march eleven or twelve miles, 
we know, from Skenesborough (Whitehall) to Fort Ann, after 3 v. m. 
on the Oth July, consecjuently he had no time to obstruct Wood Creek 
on that day. Next day he fought an engagement three miles in 
advance of Fort Ann — i. e., in the direction of Skenesborough — re- 
treated to Fort Ann, burned the post, and fell back nine miles farther 
to Fort Edward — having nuxrched iit'teen miles, besides fighting des- 
perately for a number of hours on the 7th. Consequently he could 
have had no time on the 7th. When and how did he perform the en- 
gineering feats attributed to him ? Anciiok (J. W. de P.) 

reports of the cannon of the Britisli gimboals, wliicli were firing at tlie galleys 
wliicli were lying at the wharf. By uncommon clfort and industry, Burgoyne had 
broken through the chain, boom, and bridge, at Ticondcroga, and had followed in 
pursuit with the ' Royal George' and ' Intiexible ' and a detachment of the gun- 
boats under Captain Carter. The pursuit had been pressed with such vigor that, 
at the very moment 'when the Amencaus were landinr/ at Skenesborough, three British 
regimeuts disembarked at the head of South Day, Avith the intention of occujiying 
the road to Fort Edward. Had Burgoyne delayed the attack upon the galleys 
until these regiments had reached the F"ort Edward road, the whole parly at 
Skenesborough would have been taken prisoners. Aktrtned, however, by tlu; ap- 
proach of the gunboats, the latter blew tip three of the galleys, set fire to the fort, 
mill, and storehouse, and retired in great confusion iotcard Fort Ann, Occasionally 
the oterbunlened party would falter on tlieir retreat, when the startling cry of 
' March on, the Indians are at our heels,' would revive their drooping energies and 
give strength to their weakened limbs. At five o'clock in the morning [7th July], 
they reached Fort Ann, where they were joined by many of the invalids who had 
been carried up Wood Creek in boats. A number of the sick, with the cannon, 
provisions, and most of the baggage, wci'e left behind at Skenesborough. 

On the 7lh, a small reinforcement, sent from Fort Edward by Schuyler, arrived 
at Fort Ann. xVbout the same time a detachment of British troops approached 
within sight of the fort. This detachment was attacked from the fort, and re- 
pulsed with some loss; a surgeon, a wounded captain, and twelve privates were 
taken prisoners by the Americans. The next day Fort Ann was burned, and the 
garrison retreated to Fort Eilward, which was then occupied by Gen. Schuyler." — 
" History of Saratoga County, New York," by Nathaniel Bartlett Sylvester. Phila- 
delphia : Evarts and Ensign, 1878, page 51. 



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